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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jason Jay Ward appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of rape and his guilty plea to a persistent violator enhancement.
Ward claims (1) fundamental error in relation to the prosecutor's impeachment of
him pursuant to I.RE. 41 O; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) evidentiary error
based on an alleged lack of foundation for the DNA evidence admitted at trial;
and (4) cumulative error.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On May 21, 2011, Ward, his friend Colby Redgrave, and Redgrave's exgirlfriend, M.M., were at Ward's house one evening after boating earlier in the
day.

(Tr., p.102, Ls.4-6, p.105, L.6 - p.110, L.3.) During the course of the

evening, Colby invited two female friends over, Sonia and her cousin.

(Tr.,

p.110, L.13 - p.111, L.1, p.430, L.25 - p.431, L.9.) Sonia and her cousin stayed
for a short time and then left. (Tr., p.431, L.17 - p.432, L.1.)
At one point, M.M. and Redgrave went into one of Ward's bedrooms. (Tr.,
p.114, L.7 - p.115, L5.) M.M. testified that she and Redgrave talked about their
relationship and M.M. was interested in reconciling. (Tr., p.115, Ls.6-12.) M.M.
testified that, while in the bedroom with Redgrave, they kissed but she declined
his efforts to have sex and went back out into the living room. (Tr., p.115, L.16 p.116, L.5.)

Redgrave came out of the bedroom a few minutes later, "flipped

[M.M.] the bird" and left. (Tr., p.116, Ls.6-11.) M.M. followed Redgrave outside
because she was expecting him to give her a ride home. (Tr., p.116, Ls.12-17.)

1

M.M. waited a few minutes for Redgrave to come back to get her; when he did
not, she left Ward's house, started walking, and tried to call her sister to come
pick her up. (Tr., p.117, Ls.8-12.) M.M. said that, as she left Ward's, he told her
he would give her a ride if she gave him $10.00 for gas.

(Tr., p.117, L.24 -

p.118, L.4.) M.M. declined the offer because she "didn't feel comfortable around
Jason Ward to begin with." (Tr., p.118, Ls.4-7)
After M.M. had been walking for about "20 minutes or so," Ward pulled up
in his truck and stopped her. (Tr., p.118, L.18 - p.119, L.7.) Ward opened the
door of his truck and told M.M. to "get in" and then he got out wearing only a blue
shirt - Ward was not wearing any pants or underwear.

(Tr., p.119, Ls.8-22.)

Ward then grabbed M.M. by the ponytail and made her get in the truck and told
her to drink three cups of alcohol. (Tr., p.119, L.23 - p.121, L.5.) When M.M.
spilled one of them, Ward hit her. (Tr., p.121, Ls.12-16.)
Ward drove M.M. to a secluded location near a canal. (Tr., p.125, L.16 p.126, L.19.) There, Ward stopped his truck and "climbed over to the passenger
seat and ... got on top of [M.M.]." (Tr., p.126, Ls.21-23.) M.M. asked Ward to
get off of her and pushed him as he tried to kiss her and undo her pants. (Tr.,
p.127, Ls.1-10.) Unable to remove M.M.'s pants inside the truck, Ward pulled
M.M. out of the truck by the wrist, got behind her and "tried to bend [her] over"
and undo her pants again. (Tr., p.127, L.21 - p.129, L.3.) Again unsuccessful,
Ward had M.M. lay on the ground.

(Tr., p.129, Ls.10-14.) M.M. pushed and

scratched Ward as he was on top of her.

(Tr., p.130, Ls.10-17.)

Ward

eventually forced M.M.'s pants down and raped her. (Tr., p.131, L.11 - p.132,
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L.15, .136, Ls.12-23.)

During the sexual assault, Ward also choked M.M.,

pinched the insides of her thighs, and bit her. (Tr., p.134, L.20 - p.135, L.16,
p.143, Ls.3-12.)

After raping M.M., Ward removed his penis and started

slapping M.M. on the stomach with it until he ejaculated. (Tr., p.137, Ls.2-11.)
After Ward ejaculated, he walked to the front of his truck while M.M. sat
crying, smoking a cigarette, and trying to think of a way to escape. (Tr., p.139,
L.2 - p.139, L.21.) Ward approached M.M. a second time and said, "Get up.
We're doing it again." (Tr., p.141, Ls.8-12.) Ward proceeded to have sex with
M.M. a second time. (Tr., p.141, Ls.21-25.) The second time, Ward "pinched
the inside of [M.M.'s] legs some more," "grabbed [her] hips," and "choked [her)
again." (Tr., p.142, Ls.3-5.) Ward then made M.M. get back in the truck and
drove her to a stop sign by some railroad tracks and told her to "get out." (Tr.,
p.144, L.14- p.145, L.19, p.148, L.25-p.149, L.10.) M.M. called her mom and
911 and was transported to the hospital where she underwent a sexual assault
exam.

(Tr., p.150, Ls.5-20; see generally Tr., pp.307-345 (testimony of nurse

who examined M.M., collected DNA evidence for the sexual assault kit and
observed M.M.'s distraught demeanor and her injuries).)
Law enforcement interviewed Ward later that day - May 22, 2011. (Tr.,
p.404, L.25 - p.405, L.21.)

Deputy Jeff Haskell observed and photographed

scratches on Ward's arms and back.

(Tr., p.405, L.22 - p.406, L.10, p.407,

L.22.) Ward claimed "he had been boating earlier in the day and that the water
was choppy and he must have received them while he was boating" and
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"mentioned something about coming in contact with the windshield of the boat."
(Tr., p.408, Ls.2-4.)
The state charged Ward with forcibly raping M.M. and alleged he is a
persistent violator. (R., pp.34-35, 92-93.) Ward pied not guilty and the case was
set for trial.

On December 20, 2011, the day Ward's trial was to begin, Ward

pied guilty. (Tr., pp.6-27; see R., pp.152-161.) Pursuant to an agreement with
the state, Ward, who was represented by Doug Nelson, agreed to plead guilty to
the charged offense in exchange for dismissal of the persistent violator
enhancement and an agreed upon sentence of 15 years with seven years fixed
to run concurrent "with the two prior convictions that he has." (Tr., p.6, L.19 p.7, L.2; R., pp.166-169.)
Approximately one month later, Ward retained new counsel and two
months after that, on February 29, 2012, Ward filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea with a supporting affidavit and memorandum. (R., pp.176, 185-200.)
The court held a hearing on Ward's motion at which Ward and Nelson testified.
(Tr., pp.29-78.)

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Ward's

motion, finding Ward's guilty plea was entered based on erroneous legal advice.
(Tr., p.73, L.25 - p.75, L.3.) Specifically, the court found that Nelson misstated
the law when he told Ward that "he could go to the penitentiary on [his] felony
DUI charge as a result of [the court) finding probable cause that he committed
the offense of rape even if a jury acquitted him." (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-11.) This was a
misstatement, upon which Ward relied, because the court could not use "conduct
that occurs prior to a conviction to justify a probation violation" - in other words,
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Ward could not violate his probation in his DUI case based on the rape charge in
this case since the rape occurred prior to the DUI conviction. (Tr., p.74, Ls.8-18.)
Upon granting Ward's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his case was scheduled
for trial and the state filed a Second Amended Information again alleging rape
and a persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.76, Ls.5-8; R., pp.232-236, 239240.) Ward's defense at trial was that M.M. consented to have sex with him and
asked him to bite and choke her. (See generally Tr., pp.457-479.)
The jury found Ward guilty of rape and Ward pied guilty to the persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp.315, 338.) The court imposed a unified 20-year
sentence with seven years fixed to run consecutive to a sentences Ward was
serving in two other cases.

(R., pp.349-353.)

appeal. (R., pp.359-361.)
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Ward filed a timely notice of

ISSUES
Ward states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the use of the Appellant's testimony from a previously
withdrawn guilty plea violate the fundamental constitutional
rights of Appellant?

2.

Did the prosecution commit prosecutorial misconduct and in
it's [sic] questioning of the defense witness?

3.

Did the Trial Court error [sic] in the admission of evidence
over an objection as to chain of custody?

4.

Does the Cumulative Error Doctrine Apply?

(Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief"), p.1.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Ward failed to show fundamental error based upon the prosecutor's
use of statements Ward made during his guilty plea colloquy to impeach
him when he testified at trial?

2.

Has Ward failed to show the prosecutor committed misconduct?

3.

Has Ward failed to show the district court erred in admitting the DNA
evidence?

4.

Since Ward has failed to show any error, does his claim of cumulative
error necessarily fail?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Ward Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Based On The Prosecutor's
Proper Use Of I.RE. 410 To Impeach Him When Ward Testified At Trial
Inconsistent With Statements He Made During His Guilty Plea Colloquy
A.

Introduction
Ward claims, for the first time on appeal, that cross-examination of him

with statements he made in conjunction with his guilty plea violated his
"fundamental rights against self-incrimination and to effective assistance of
counsel" since he was later allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

(Appellant's

Brief, p.5.) Because Ward did not preserve this claim by objection below, 1 he
must demonstrate the error is fundamental. Ward has failed to meet his burden.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010).

C.

The Proper Application Of I.RE. 410 Does Not Constitute Fundamental
Error
Idaho Rule of Evidence 41 O(a) states, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the
following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding admissible

1

The only objection Ward raised below was relevance. (Tr., p.481, L.8.)
7

against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in
the plea discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; [or]

(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings
under Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure or
comparable Federal or state procedure regarding either of the
foregoing pleas[.]
Such statements are, however, admissible under certain circumstances.
I.RE. 41 0(a). One such exception is that statements "made in the course of any
proceedings under Rule 11" may be used for impeachment purposes "in the
same criminal action or proceeding." I.RE. 41 0(b)(3).
Pursuant to the exception set forth in I.RE. 41 0(b)(3), the state sought to
impeach Ward, who testified at trial, with statements he made during his guilty
plea colloquy that were inconsistent with his trial testimony.

Specifically, the

following exchange occurred as part of Ward's plea colloquy:
THE COURT: To the charge set forth in the Amended Information
that on or about May 22, 2011, in the County of Twin Falls, State of
Idaho, that you penetrated the vaginal opening of a person named
M.M., . . . , a female person, with your penis, and where she
resisted, but her resistance was overcome by force and violence,
how do you plead?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
THE COURT: Can you tell me in summary form what you did that
makes you guilty of that charge?
THE DEFENDANT: I had sex with [M.M.].
THE COURT: And did she resist?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
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THE COURT: And was that resistance overcome by force and
violence on your part?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
(Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.14.)
At trial, after Ward denied raping M.M. and instead claimed she asked him
to have sex and asked him to bite her, choke her, and pull her hair (see generally
Tr., pp.465-475), the prosecutor impeached Ward with the portions of his prior
testimony in which he admitted M.M. resisted and that her resistance was
overcome by force and violence on his part2 (Tr., p.487, L.25 - p.490, L.1 ).
Ward does not actually challenge the admissibility of his statements under
I.R.E. 41 0(b)(3).

Instead, Ward notes the importance of a defendant's "Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination" and the "right to effective assistance
of counsel" and asks the Court to adopt a rule, with these "concepts in mind,"
that requires a district court to determine as a prerequisite to admissibility under
I.R.E. 410(b)(3), whether the statements were "voluntary" and "reliable."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.)

The question on appeal, however, is not whether

1.R.E. 410 should be amended through judicial opinion; the question is whether
Ward has demonstrated fundamental error in the district court's application of
the rule to his case. Ward has failed to do so.

2

To be clear, the prosecutor did not introduce evidence that Ward pied guilty.
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In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that unpreserved claims of constitutional error 3 are reviewed
using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).
Ward has failed to satisfy any part of this test. Ward's reference to the
existence of rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is insufficient to show
an actual constitutional violation. With respect to the Fifth Amendment, Ward,
relying on Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), argues "any statement used
against a criminal defendant must be deemed voluntary."
p.7.) Ward's reliance on Jackson is misplaced.

(Appellant's Brief,

Jackson only stands for the

proposition that a conviction cannot be "founded, in whole or in part, upon an
involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession."
378 U.S. at 377. And, the more precise issue before the Court in Jackson was
the state procedure that allowed a jury to determine the voluntariness of a
confession after the trial judge made a "preliminary determination" that "the

3

"[E]videntiary errors that simply involve violations of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence do not implicate constitutional considerations unless the error results in
the defendant being deprived [of] his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Dunlap, _
P.3d _ , 2013 WL
4539806 *16 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted).
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evidence presents a fair question as to [the confession's] voluntariness." 387
U.S. at 377. The Court found such a procedure violates due process.

Since

Ward's statements during his guilty plea colloquy do not qualify as an allegedly
coerced confession and Ward has failed to identify any unconstitutional
procedure like the one condemned in Jackson, that case is inapposite.
The case that is instructive in relation to Ward's Fifth Amendment claim is
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 (1971). There, the Supreme Court
held that statements made in violation of the Fifth Amendment right recognized
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), can be used to impeach a defendant
who testifies inconsistently with those statements at trial. As explained in Harris:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily
taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak
truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more
than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary
process [by asking the petitioner about contradictory statements he
made to law enforcement]. Had inconsistent statements been
made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be
contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way
of cross-examination and impeachment.
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
We hold,
therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached
by use of his earlier conflicting statements.
401 U.S. at 225-226 (citations and footnote omitted).
Ward does not cite Harris but instead relies heavily on the Colorado Court
of Appeals' opinion in People v. Butler, 929 P.2d 36 (Colo Ct. App. 1996), to
support his Fifth Amendment argument.
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(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8).

Ward's

reliance on Butler is also misplaced because the court in Butler was applying
Colorado Rule of Evidence 410, which actually includes the language Ward
seeks to impose upon I.R.E. 410. Colorado's rule provides, in pertinent part:
[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the
crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in any
connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not
admissible in any civil or criminal action, case, or proceeding
against the person who made the plea or offer. This rule shall not
apply to the introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made
in court on the record in connection with any of the foregoing pleas
or offers where offered for impeachment purposes.
Butler at 40 (quoting CRE 410).
Even assuming the "voluntary and reliable" requirement is of constitutional
dimension such that I.R.E. 410 should be interpreted as requiring such a finding
(as opposed to amending the rule to incorporate the requirement should the
Idaho Supreme Court deem it appropriate), Ward has not established the
statements he made as part of his guilty plea were, in fact, involuntary. That the
district court allowed him to withdraw the plea itself based on his attorney's
erroneous legal advice that had nothing to do with Ward's guilt or innocence,
does not mean the statements made in relation thereto were not voluntary and
reliable and Ward has cited no evidence to the contrary. Compare People v.
McCormick, 881 P.2d 423 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) ("Promises made as part of a
plea agreement are not inherently coercive or improper."); People v. Cole, 584
P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1978) (citations omitted) ("no accused should be permitted to
profit by falsifying testimony to obtain a favorable plea agreement and to mislead
the court").

12

Ward's reliance on the Sixth Amendment to satisfy the first prong of Perry
is even more tenuous than his reliance on the Fifth Amendment in terms of
establishing an actual constitutional violation.

Ward's only argument in this

regard is that "[a]llowing the use of the defendant's testimony, even for
impeachment purposes, allows the State to continue the ineffective assistance of
counsel experienced by Mr. Ward and violates his right to [sic] self-incrimination."
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

As previously noted, Ward's right against self-

incrimination was not violated by impeaching him with his prior inconsistent
statements, which is the assertion upon which his Sixth Amendment claim
appears to be premised.

Moreover, the Sixth Amendment issue that was

addressed by the district court in relation to Ward's guilty plea was fully resolved
when the court granted Ward relief by allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. 4
Original counsel's erroneous advice related to the consequences of the rape
charge in a different case, i.e., that the allegations could serve as the basis of a
probation violation. Such advice did not render Ward's actual admissions during
his plea colloquy involuntary or unreliable, it only meant his guilty plea was
entered based on an erroneous understanding of the effects of such a plea.

4

"[A] claim for ineffective assistance of counsel usually requires an evidentiary
haring, and resolution of such claims can be difficult for an appellate court
examining a trial record in which counsel's performance was not at issue." Smith
v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009). Because the district
court addressed counsel's performance in relation to Ward's guilty plea following
the evidentiary hearing on Ward's motion to withdraw his plea, the state will
assume, for the sake of argument, that the general rule precluding consideration
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal does not prevent Ward
from attempting to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation for purposes of the
fundamental error analysis.
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Thus, any cognizable Sixth Amendment concern did not "continue" just because
Ward was not permitted to make inconsistent statements under oath once he
proceeded to trial.
Even if Ward could get past the first prong of Perry, he cannot
demonstrate plain error. His argument to the contrary is a conclusory statement
of his belief that "it is clear from the record that his rights were violated without
his knowledge."

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

Not only is the record anything but

"clear" that he suffered any constitutional violation, there is no clear or plain error
because the district court correctly applied I.R.E. 410 as written. As the Court of
Appeals held in State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 271 P.3d 1227 (Ct. App. 2012)
(citations and quotations omitted), "the inquiry is whether the error is clear under
current law, or, ... whether the available authorities provide a clear answer to
the question." It was not the district court's obligation to create new law in Idaho
by sua sponte evaluating the constitutionality of a rule promulgated by the Idaho
Supreme Court or by imposing requirements on the rule that do not exist. See
State v. Trujillo, 605 P.2d 232, 235 (N.M. 1980) ("Rule 410 does not set up

14

standards of relevancy and trustworthiness, and we will not impose any on it." 5)
Nor was it incumbent on counsel to make a novel challenge to the
constitutionality of the rule.

Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d

1269, 1277 (2010) ("this Court will generally not find deficient performance where
counsel fails to argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of law"). This is
particularly true given the principle recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court that
"[t]he Rules of Evidence embody the balancing test which safeguards a
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense along with protection of the
state's interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process." State v. Meister, 148
Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2009).
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Ward to
"demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. With respect to the prejudice prong of
the fundamental error test, Ward argues the trial court's comments at sentencing
"that it was left with the belief that neither side told the whole story" demonstrate
"any evidence can be significant in determining how much weight the jurors
placed on such testimony." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Thus, Ward concludes, "[i]t

Unlike I.RE. 410, New Mexico's Rule 410 provides no exceptions and the court
in Trujillo declined the state's request to create a judicial exception to the rule
that would allow for use of statements for purposes of impeachment even though
the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Harris, supra, and the United States Senate's proposed version of F.R.E. 410,
which "would have permitted 'voluntary statements made by a defendant in
connection with pleas or plea negotiations [to] later be used to impeach him if he
subsequently stood trial, took the stand, and testified inconsistently." Trujillo,
605 P.2d at 234-235.
5
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is difficult not to assume [his] testimony ... influenced the jury's finding of guilt."
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Ward's argument fails.
There was overwhelming evidence presented that Ward forcibly raped
M.M. From M.M.'s distraught and tearful demeanor from the time she called 911

through her contact with the first responders and hospital personnel, the injuries
she sustained, and the scratches on Ward observed by law enforcement, it is
difficult to imagine the jury reaching any conclusion other than that Ward was
guilty of forcibly raping M.M. While Ward testified the act was consensual, his
testimony was not believable not because he was impeached with his prior
admissions but because it was inconsistent with the physical evidence. Further,
to the extent the district court's comments at sentencing inform the analysis,
contrary to Ward's claim on appeal, they do not favor him.
The snippet upon which Ward relies, when read in context, related not to
the actual act of rape but to other testimony about the events of the night, such
as how much alcohol was consumed. (See Tr., p.520, L.20 - p.521, L.18.) As
to the strength of the evidence of rape, the court stated:
Obviously if a defendant believes in a sexual situation that
he is having consensual relationships with someone, then likely,
then logically that defendant would not contemplate his criminal
conduct would cause or threaten harm. What's troubling in this
case is that, frankly, the facts just don't support that. I don't think -1think that's why the jury convicted you.
(Tr., p.520, Ls.7-14.)
The court further commented:
And there are, I guess in my view, different levels of rape.
They are all unacceptable.
They all have significant
consequences, but the one that you have been convicted with in

16

this case, unfortunately, puts you in kind of what I consider the
upper echelon of more egregious type of rapes because it's a
forcible rape. The evidence in this case to this jury supports that
conclusion.
I don't know what this jury was thinking, but as I sat and
listened to the evidence in this case, I had a hard time justifying in
my own mind how this could have been a consensual encounter
when [M.M.] ends up with the type of physical injuries that were
described during the course of this trial. That's totally inconsistent
to me with anything approaching consensual sex.

I recognize - I don't know whether this is a situation that
started off in a consensual way and got out of hand, or again,
whether we just haven't heard all testimony or the truth of what
occurred here. But again, it really doesn't matter because you
stand convicted of a violent sexual offense.
(Tr., p.526, L.18 - p.527, L.15.)
Ward has failed to show any alleged error in the proper impeachment of
him under I.R.E. 410 violated his substantial rights. Because Ward has not his
met his burden under this prong or any other prong of Perry, he is not entitled to
relief on his first claim.

11.
Ward Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Ward contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by trying to discredit

a defense witness by "[i]nsinuating" he was "acting as a pimp" and by "mocking
and making noises" in response to the witness's testimony. (Appellant's Brief,
p.10.)

At trial, Ward requested a mistrial based on one of his claims of

misconduct and objected to the other.
p.452, L.22 - p.453, L.10.)

(Tr., p.447, Ls.9-18, p.448, Ls.4-15,

Review of the record and the applicable legal
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standards shows Ward has failed to show misconduct, much less that he was
entitled to a mistrial or is entitled to a new trial based on the conduct about which
he complains.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the denial of a motion for mistrial, "the question on

appeal is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in light of
circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made."

State v.

Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _ , 297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). "Instead,
[the appellate court] examine[s] whether the event that precipitated the motion
constituted reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record."

kl

(citations omitted). "The trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed
only if [the event that triggered the mistrial motion], viewed retrospectively,
amounted to reversible error."

kl

An error is not reversible if the "reviewing

court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict." Id.
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If the alleged error
was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, the defendant bears the
initial burden on appeal of establishing that the complained of conduct was
improper. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59, 253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011 ); State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "Where the defendant
meets his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the State then has
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the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt
that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry, 150
Idaho at 227-28, 245 P.3d at 979-80.

C.

Ward Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His
Request For A Mistrial
In cross-examining defense witness Colby Redgrave, the prosecutor

asked:

"When you invited the two girls, Sonia and her cousin over, were you

trying to get some girls for [Ward]?" (Tr., p.449, Ls.9-11.) Redgrave answered:
"No, I wasn't. I had hung out with Sonia other than hanging out there. It wasn't
anywhere around that way." (Tr., p.447, Ls.12-14.) Defense counsel then asked
to approach and there was a "[s]idebar conference."

(Tr., p.447, Ls.16-18.)

After Redgrave was done testifying, the court allowed defense counsel to make a
record regarding the subject of the sidebar, which was a request for a mistrial.
(Tr., p.452, L.22 - p.453, L.3.)

Defense counsel argued the prosecutor's

question constituted misconduct because, according to counsel, it "essentially"
asked if Redgrave "was pimping for the defendant to get women over there."
(Tr., p.453, Ls.4-8.) Defense counsel further argued it was not "relevant" and
was "done to inflame the passions of the jury."

(Tr., p.453, Ls.8-9.)

prosecutor responded to the accusation as follows:
... I certainly don't believe that it was prosecutorial misconduct.
It's certainly relevant to this matter. He did invite two girls over
there. There has been a lot of discussion about those two girls. I
wanted to know why he would have invited those two girls over
there when his ex-girlfriend was there. The testimony has been
she was trying to get back into a relationship with [Redgrave].
There has been some conflicting testimony, I believe, as to who
was trying to get back into the relationship, but I certainly think that
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The

it's proper inquiry to determine what the motive was for having
those two girls come over.
(Tr., p.453, Ls.12-24.)
The court denied the motion for mistrial, stating:
Well, the question that was asked didn't involve the use of
the word pimping for starters. I didn't, frankly, take the question
that way either. I thought that counsel was asking again, as she
just, as Madam Prosecutor said, what was the motive for doing
that. I'm not sure that's particularly relevant in this case, but I don't
see it as prosecutorial misconduct.
(Tr., p.454, Ls.5-12.)
On appeal, Ward argues that "[i]nsinuating that Mr. Redgrave was acting
as a pimp to get some girls is totally indefensible. There was no evidence to
support such a charge." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Contrary to Ward's argument,
and as noted by the district court, the prosecutor insinuated no such thing. That
counsel chose to interpret the question in such a way does not make the
question itself inappropriate or misconduct. Further, there was evidence, beyond
the fact of the rape itself, that Ward was interested in "trying to get some girls."
The state presented evidence that Ward sent Redgrave a message on May 22,
2011, at 3:54 a.m., approximately 12 minutes after M.M. called 911, which read:
"Nice dude that f'n bitch is f'n pscho ur right sinona [sic6] is way better cooler[.]
holy shit[.]" (Tr., p.416, Ls.20-21 (911 call at 3:42 a.m.); p.486, L.5 - p.487, L.2.;

6

Presumably "[S]inona" refers to Sonia, the girl who came over to Ward's with
her cousin earlier in the evening at Redgrave's invitation. Redgrave admitted he
also had previously had an intimate relationship with Sonia. (Tr., p.431, Ls.1416.)
20

Exhibit 38 (verbatim).)
Ward has failed to show error in the denial of his motion for mistrial.

D.

Ward Has Failed To Show Error In The Court's Response To His Claim
That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Allegedly "Mocking" And
"Making Noises" In Response To Redgrave's Testimony
In further cross-examining Redgrave, the following exchange occurred:
Q: And you left [M.M.] there with [Ward] alone; correct?

A. Yes, momentarily.
Q: Momentarily. And it's your --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, we would request the prosecutor
not make gratuitous comments and noises in front of the jury.
THE COURT: I didn't observe anything.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She, just for the record, Judge, she
laughed and said "momentarily" like she was mocking the witness.
THE COURT: So noted.
(Tr., p.448, Ls.4-15.)
On appeal, Ward complains that "mocking and making noises at a witness
diminishes the credibility of a witness."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Ward's

argument, of course, presupposes the prosecutor mocked Redgrave or made
noises - something the district court did not observe. Nor does the record reflect
what sort of "noises" the prosecutor supposedly made. On this record, there is
no basis for a finding of misconduct. Further, while Ward claims on appeal that
the alleged mocking and noise-making was part of his request for a mistrial
(Appellant's Brief, p.9), the record does not support that assertion. The sidebar
at which counsel requested a mistrial preceded defense counsel's "objection" to
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the "gratuitous comments and noises" and the record defense counsel made
regarding his motion did not reference the "mocking or noises." (Tr., p.447, L.18
(sidebar conference), p.448, Ls.8-10 ("objection" to "gratuitous comments and
noises"), p.453, Ls.4-10 (argument on motion for mistrial).) The only relief Ward
requested in relation to the "gratuitous comments and noises" was that the
prosecutor not do it. (Tr., p.448, Ls.8-10.) Even assuming the prosecutor did
what defense counsel claimed, she apparently stopped "do[ing] it" because
counsel never again objected to such conduct.
Even if Ward could meet his burden of showing prosecutorial misconduct
in the first instance, he is not entitled to a new trial on this basis because the
alleged misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. As previously noted,
the evidence that Ward raped M.M. was incredibly strong. Whether Redgrave
was credible in his testimony that he only "momentarily" left Ward's before
supposedly coming back and parking nearby so he could supposedly watch M.M.
leave voluntarily with Ward was hardly significant to the jury's determination of
what happened between Ward and M.M. on the side of the road where there
were no witnesses. Thus, even assuming any prosecutorial error, the error was
harmless.

111.
Ward Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of The DNA Evidence
A.

Introduction
Ward argues admission of the DNA evidence was erroneous because, he

claims, the state failed to establish a proper chain of custody. (Appellant's Brief,
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p.10.) This Court should decline to consider Ward's claim because he failed to
support it with argument and authority. Even if considered, Ward has failed to
show evidentiary error in the admission of the DNA evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A trial court's determination that evidence is supported by a proper

foundation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho
643, 977 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 757,
838 P.2d 885, 886 (Ct. App. 1992)).

C.

Ward Has Failed To Show Error In Admission Of The DNA Evidence
Following the rape, M.M. was transported to the hospital where a nurse

conducted a sexual assault exam and collected swabs from M.M.'s vagina,
abdomen, and shoulder. (Tr., p.311, L.17 - p.314, L.19.) The purpose of those
swabs was to "collect DNA evidence." (Tr., p.313, L.21.) Once collected, the
nurse placed the swabs in envelopes and placed the envelopes in a sealed box.
(Tr., p.314, Ls.22-24, p.319, Ls.9-12; Exhibit 23 (sexual assault kit).) The nurse
testified that, after the box is sealed, she "fill[s] out a chain of custody form and
then hand[s] it to the officer and they [sic] sign the chain of custody form." (Tr.,
p.317, Ls.18-20.)
Evidence technician Ronald McKinlay testified he received the sexual
assault kit, which was identified as Exhibit 23, from Detective Becky White on
May 22, 2011.

(Tr., p.347, Ls.4-19, p.348, Ls.4-5.)

Upon receiving the kit,

McKinlay placed a label on the outside and placed it into evidence. (Tr., p.347,
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Ls.12-15.) McKinlay testified that when he received the kit, the seals were intact
because "the seal has to be on there before [he will] even accept it into
evidence." (Tr., p.347, L.24 - p.348, L.12.) The day after McKinlay placed the
kit into evidence, he "sent it to the Meridian ISP lab for testing."

(Tr., p.348,

Ls.13-17.)
Kerry Russell, an employee at the Idaho State Police Forensic Service
Laboratory explained, in detail, the protocol for receiving evidence at the lab and
testified that when she received the kit, "[i]t was evidence tape sealed" and the
seal was intact. (Tr., p.358, L.15 - p.2, p.365, L.19 - p.366, L.4.) Russell then
explained the procedures for testing the swabs contained in the kit and for
repackaging upon completion of testing.

(Tr., p.366, L.14 - p.371, L.18.)

Another lab employee, Stacy Guess, also testified to the procedures she used in
conducting the DNA analysis. (See generally Tr., pp.379-387.)
For comparison purposes, Ward submitted an "oral buccal swab (saliva
sample) on 5/22/11 which was sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for
testing." (R., p.285.) Ward stipulated prior to trial that "[n]o additional foundation
w[ould] be necessary to prove that the sample [he] provided was the sample sent
to the Lab in this case." (R., p.285.) The court read the stipulation to the jury at
trial. (Tr., p.395, Ls.3-8.)
The DNA from the swabs matched the DNA sample submitted by Ward.
(Tr., p.387, Ls.3-22.)
During Guess's testimony, there was a bench conference "with regard to
[Ward's] objections and concerns regarding the chain of custody." (Tr., p.421,
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Ls.16-20.) The court told defense counsel "at the bench that [it] was going to
overrule those and [it] did, but [it] would give [counsel] an opportunity to make a
record of what that objection was, which was timely."

(Tr., p.421, Ls.20-23.)

Defense counsel then made the following record:
We stipulated with the state that the oral swab taken from
the defendant, that the court read the stipulation that required no
further foundation it was taken from the defendant and sent to the
lab. The other evidence that was tested by the lab and testified
about from the DNA expert we did not stipulate to that. So there
was, our argument is, a break in the chain of custody there
because the state did not establish the adequate foundation to
show how it got into the hands, okay, the evidence was taken from
the nurse ... at the hospital.

[The evidence] ended up in the evidence locker at the Twin
Falls County Sheriff's Office. We don't know what happened to it in
the interim, if anything happened to it in the interim, and so the
chain of custody was not established there.
So our objection was essentially foundation and chain of
custody that this should not have been placed before the jury
because a critical person that handled all of this, collected all of this
was Detective Becky White, who did not testify in this trial, and we
did not get the chance to examine her. The state cannot lay the
proper foundation with [sic] her, and we did not have the right to
confrontation as far as how she handled this evidence.
(Tr., p.422, L.2 - p.423, L.2.)
The court overruled Ward's objection noting that although there was a
"technical gap in the chain of custody ... as to who transported from the hospital
to the evidence locker," the evidence was sealed when it arrived at the evidence
locker and there was "no evidence ... that the seals were broken." (Tr., p.423,
Ls.3-25.)
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On appeal, Ward reasserts his position that the state could not establish a
chain of custody without the testimony of Detective White. 7 This Court should
decline to consider Ward's claim because he has failed to support it with any
authority. The only authority Ward offers is the abuse of discretion standard of
review applicable to evidentiary issues and a single reference to I.R.E. 901 that
appears in his concluding sentence: "Without Detective White's testimony, the
chain was not established as required by I.R.E. 901 and the evidence should not
have been admitted." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Nowhere in his brief does Ward
explain what is required for admission under I.R.E. 901 nor does he cite any
case law to support his assertion that Detective White's testimony was
necessary in order to admit the evidence. This Court should, therefore, decline
to consider Ward's claim of evidentiary error.

Dawson v. Cheyovich Family

Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010) (citations omitted) ("Where an
appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support
his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite
to be heard by the Court. A general attack on the findings and conclusions of
the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is
insufficient to preserve an issue.").

It appears Detective White was not called as a witness at trial because she was
terminated from the Twin Fall County Sheriff's Offfice. In fact, Ward filed a
motion in limine to prevent her from testifying on that basis. (R., p.253.) And,
Ward's stipulation in relation to his saliva swab was because Detective White
collected the sample from him and he did not want to be re-tested. (Tr., p.89,
L.6 - p.90, L.18.) However, Ward declined to stipulate to foundation for any
other DNA evidence. (Tr., p.90, Ls.5-18.)
7
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Even if considered, Ward's claim fails.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 901

states, in part: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."

"Often, the party

offering evidence establishes the chain of custody in order to create a
presumption that it was not materially altered during the chain of custody." State
v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 647, 977 P.2d 905, 909 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations
omitted). "The burden then shifts to the defendant to overcome the presumption,
and the defendant must make some showing that the evidence was tampered or
meddled with."

kl

"Mere speculation that the evidence was mishandled or

tampered with is insufficient to establish a break in the chain of custody." State v.
Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 758, 838 P.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover,
"[p]roof of the chain of custody is a means by which identity of an exhibit may be
established and by which the standard of admissibility can be satisfied; it is not,
of itself, a separate requisite for admissibility."

Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 647, 977

P.2d at 909 (citation omitted).
"Generally, in laying a proper foundation for the admission of test results
of a blood sample the practicalities of proof do not require the prosecution to
negate all possibilities of substitution or tampering." Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 647,
977 P.2d at 909 (citations omitted). State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 354 P.2d
751 (1960), is instructive. "In Coburn, the evidence established that the doctor
drew the blood and gave it to a nurse, who sealed it, marked it, and gave it to the
sheriff." Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 647, 977 P.2d at 909 (discussing Coburn, supra).
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"The sheriff then took the samples to the [hospital], delivering them to a nurse
who said she would put them into the refrigerator for the technician." Coburn, 82
Idaho at 447.

"The following morning, the witness Veibell took those blood

samples labeled 'Max Coburn' from the refrigerator and performed the required
tests thereon."

~

The Court stated:

"Although the testimony of the person

receiving the blood samples at the hospital is absent from the record,
nevertheless the circumstances sufficiently disclose the identification of the
samples tested as being those drawn from appellant."

~

The Court further

noted the absence of "any evidence which would cast the slightest inference that
any irregularity occurred after the samples were delivered to the hospital by [the
sheriff]. Therefore, such evidence was properly admitted."

~

Similarly, in Gilpin "there was a detailed explanation regarding hospital
procedure and protocol" in and Gilpin "failed to offer any evidence that her blood
samples were tampered with or plausibly suggest the same from the record."
Gilpin, 132 Idaho at 648, 977 P.2d at 910. Rather, Gilpin's only complaint was
that "the hospital personnel who handled her blood were unable to independently
recollect the circumstances surrounding its chain of custody."
insufficient to "suppress" the blood test results.

~

~

This was

at 649, 977 P.2d at 911.

As in Coburn and Gilpin, the lack of testimony from Detective White
regarding her transportation of the kit from the hospital to the evidence
technician was not necessary to lay adequate foundation for admission of the
test results and, as found by the district court, there was no evidence of
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tampering. Ward's claim that the district court erred in admitting the DNA test
results fails.
Even if Ward could establish error in the admission of the DNA evidence,
any error was harmless given that Ward admitted having intercourse with M.M.
and admitted biting her. Since the only purpose of the DNA was to prove what
Ward himself admitted, any error in its admission was harmless.

IV.
Ward Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error

Ward argues that, even if "none of the errors are sufficient to justify
reversal, [he] believes that the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Ward's argument fails because he has failed to show
that the cumulative effect of the errors he preserved deprived him of a fair trial.
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P .2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). The cumulative
error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).
Even where there are two or more preserved errors, the presence of such
errors alone does not necessarily require reversal of a conviction.
Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 725, 249 P.3d 1169, 1180 (Ct. App. 2010).
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State v.
"[T]he

Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681 (1986).
Because Ward has failed demonstrate any error, much less two or more
preserved errors, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Ward guilty of rape.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2013.

JE~SJCA M. LORELLO
Dep.wty Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of December, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
CLAYNE S. ZOLLINGER
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 210
Rupert, Idaho 83350

JESS CAM. LORELLO
depu y Attorney General
I

JML/pm

\J

30

